State of Utah v. Darren D. Earl : Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1985
State of Utah v. Darren D. Earl : Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald J. Eyre; Juab County Attorney; Attorney for Appellant.
Milton T. Harmon; Attorney for Respondent.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Earl, No. 198520066.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/496
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PIa i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t , 
- v -
DARREN D. EARL, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
STIPULATION TO SUPPLEMENT 
BRIEF OF STATE 
Case No. 20066 
Come now Donald J . Eyre, J r . , Juab County At to rney , 
a t t o r n e y for the S t a t e , and Milton T. Harmon, a t t o r n e y for 
defendant , and s t i p u l a t e t h a t t h e S t a t e may supplement i t s b r i e f 
(Brief of Appe l l an t , dated October 16, 1984) with the p o r t i o n of 
Po in t I of t h e S t a t e ' s b r i e f in S t a t e v . Mendoza and Mendieta, 
Case No. 20922, t h a t r e l a t e s t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Utah R. 
Crim. P. 12(g) (see Brief of Appel lant in Mendoza a t 8-18, f i l e d 
with t h i s Court on January 29 , i $ 8 6 ) . f 
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MfLT0N "T." HARMON' 
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Nephi, Utah 84648 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH*** | | 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t , 
- v -
DARREN D. EARL, 
D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t • 
FEB 131^6 
MOTION AND ORDER TO 
SUPPLEMENT BRIEF OF _ ~ 
STATE 
Case No. 20066 
• . : • * , S»-ip'.'r-
\ Uta* 
The Sta te moves t h i s Court for permission to supplement 
i t s br ief (Brief of Appellant, dated October 16, 1984) with the 
port ion of Point I of the S t a t e ' s brief in S ta te v. Mendoza and 
Mendieta, Case No. 20922, tha t r e l a t e s to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y 
of Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) (see Brief of Appellant in Mendoza at 
8-18, f i l ed with t h i s Court on January 29, 1986). This motion i s 
supported by s t i pu l a t i on of the pa r t i e s and i s presented in an 
effor t to put before the Court the S t a t e ' s complete posi t ion 
regarding the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) . 
Therefore, the State respectfully requests that it be 
allowed to supplement its.^rief as outlined above. 
DATED t h i s /O d^y of F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 6 . 
DOtfALD J . EYjRE* JR / / 
J u a b County A t t o r n e y 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
ORDER 
Based upon stipulation of counsel and good cause 
appearingf 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State may supplement its 
brief with the portion of Point I of the State1s brief in State 
v. Mendoza and Mendieta, Case No. 20922, that relates to the 
constitutionality of Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g). 
DATED this of February, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE QF DELIVERY 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e and exac t copy of the 
foregoing S t i p u l a t i o n / Motion and Order was hand-de l ive red t o 
Milton T. Harmon, Attorney for Defendant, 36 South Main, Nephi, 
Utah 84648, t h i s Av day of February , 1986. 
/ / 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
ADOLPHO DIAZ MENDOZA and 
ALBERTO RUIZ MENDIETA, 
Defendants -Respondents . 
Case No. 20922 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM AN ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, IN 
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE J. HARLAN BURNS, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
PETER L. ROGNLIE (4131) 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
P.O. Box 579 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JOHN E. MEYERS 
Bradbury Building 
304 South Broadway, Suite 432 
Los Angeles, California 90013 
Attorney for Defendant Mendieta 
J. MacARTHUR WRIGHT 
WRIGHT & MILES 
P.O. Box 339 
S t . George, Utah 84770 
At torney for Defendant Mendoza 
friend of Mendoza1 s who was in Las Vegas, to Colorado. The 
purpose of the t r i p to Coloradof according to Mendoza, was to 
pick up Mendieta's gravely i l l mother and e i ther bring her back 
to Las Vegas or leave her a t Mendieta's s i s t e r ' s house. Mendieta 
had offered Mendoza $100 to pay for gas (S.H. 13-16). 
Mendoza reached the owner of the Mustang by telephone 
at Mendoza's home in Los Angeles. Although Mendoza spoke with 
the ownerf the owner was drunk and could not be understood. 
However, Mendoza spoke with h is own brother who told him tha t the 
owner said i t was a l l r ight to take the car to Colorado, so long 
as Mendoza returned to Los Angeles two days l a t e r . Mendozaf who 
was driving a t the time defendants were stopped, admitted tha t 
nei ther he nor his passenger, Mendieta, owned the Mustang (S.H. 
18-30). 
After considering the evidence before i t and the 
S t a t e ' s arguments concerning standing, the d i s t r i c t court granted 
defendants' motions to suppress, rul ing tha t both defendants had 
standing to challenge the stop of and subsequent search of the 
vehic le they were dr iving, tha t "there were no a r t i c u l a b l e fac t s 
as a bas is or probable cause for [the] of f icers to make the 
i n i t i a l s top of the Idlefendants [,] and t ha t the stop was 
conducted in an unreasonable manner" (Transcript of Court ' s 
Ruling on Motion to Suppress a t 3-5; RARM. 89-90; RADM. 52-3; 
Appendix A). The court denied the S t a t e ' s motion for 
reconsiderat ion and c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the order granting the 
motions to suppress (Transcript of Court Proceedings on Sept. 18, 
1985 at 3 ) . The Sta te appeals to t h i s Court from the d i s t r i c t 
cou r t ' s suppression order. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In granting defendants1 motions to suppress, the trial 
court failed to comply with the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(g). Because that rule embodies a desirable and constitutional 
modification of the exclusionary rulef the court's failure to 
make the necessary findings under it before suppressing the 
challenged evidence should result in a reversal of its 
suppression order. 
The trial court applied an incorrect standard of law in 
ruling that the stop of defendants1 vehicle was unlawful. Under 
the applicable "reasonable suspicion" testf the stop was 
constitutional. Alternatively, if the stop was not legal, 
evidence seized pursuant to it should not have been suppressed 
because the officers1 actions did not constitute a "substantial" 
violation of defendants1 constitutional rights; nor was the 
violation committed in bad faith. Under Rule 12(g), the evidence 
would therefore be admissible. 
Finally, the trial courtfs ruling on standing is 
contrary to this Court's recent decision in State v. Valdez
 f 689 
P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) . Because neither defendant owned the car 
they were driving or demonstrated a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in that car, they lack standing to challenge the search 
of the car. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS, 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE THE FINDINGS 
REQUIRED UNDER UTAH R. CRIM. P. 12(g); 
THEREFORE, ITS ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g)(1) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-
12(g)(1)) provides: 
In any motion concerning the 
admissibility of evidence or the suppression 
of evidence pursuant to this section or at 
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and 
seizure, the suppression of evidence shall 
not be granted unless the court finds the 
violation upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in 
good faith. The court shall set forth its 
reasons for such finding. 
S££. also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-12 (1982) and UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 78-16-1 and -5 (Supp. 1985) . In its order granting 
defendants1 motions to suppress (Appendix A) the trial court did 
not make the findings regarding "a substantial violation" and 
"good faith" that are required under Rule 12(g)(1). It ruled 
only "that there were no articulable facts as a basis or probable 
cause for [the] officers to make the initial stop of the 
[dlefendants and that the stop was conducted in an unreasonable 
manner." The court subsequently refused to modify that order 
even though the State asked it to make and set forth the reasons 
for the findings required under Rule 12(g)(1). gee State's 
Motion For Reconsideration and Clarification (RARM. 65-8; RADM. 
44-7). 
There can be little dispute that the trial court 
effectively ignored the specific requirements of Rule 12(g)(1) 
when it suppressed the challenged evidence. The obvious purpose 
of that rule is to avoid the operation of the exclusionary rule 
where the unlawful search or seizure was neither substantial nor 
committed in bad faith. Therefore, a court must only suppress 
evidence in accordance with the policy expressly embodied in Rule 
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12(g)• £££ al£Q §§ 77-23-12f 78-16-1 and -5; Utah R. Evid. 402 
(Supp. 1985). Because the trial court here completely failed to 
do that, this Court should reverse its order granting defendants1 
suppression motions and enter the findings argued for by the 
State in Points II or IIIf infra. Although the discussion on 
this question could end here, the State, recognizing that this 
Court has never specifically ruled upon the constitutionality of 
Utahfs statutory "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, 
2££ State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099f 1103 (Utah 1985)f will 
address that issue below. 
A. The Federal Constitution 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Nearly identical language appears in article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. Recently, in United States v. Leon, U.S. 
, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
fashioned an objective good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. Recognizing that the exclusionary rule "operates as fa 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect [on police 
misconduct], rather than a personal constitutional right of the 
person aggrieved,'" 104 S.Ct. at 3412, quoting United States v. 
Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), the Court held that the 
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prosecution may use in its case-in-chief evidence obtained by 
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued 
by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be 
unsupported by probable cause. In so holding, the Court 
concluded that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by 
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance 
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the 
substantial costs of exclusion." 104 S.Ct. at 3421. The Court 
cited with approval the following language from various cases: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule necessarily assumes that the police have 
engaged in willful, or at the very least 
negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right. By refusing to 
admit evidence gained as a result of such 
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those 
particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree 
of care toward the rights of an accused. 
Where the official conduct was pursued in 
complete good faith, however, the deterrence 
rationale loses much of its force." 
104 S.Ct. at 3419, citing Michigan v. Tinker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 
(1974); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975). 
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is 
to deter unlawful police conduct, then 
evidence obtained from a search should be 
suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may 
properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment." 
104 S.Ct. at 3419-20, £i£ing Peltier. 422 U.S. at 542. 
In short, where the officer's conduct is 
objectively reasonable, 
"excluding the evidence will not further 
the ends of the exclusionary rule in any 
appreciable way; for it is painfully 
apparent that . . . the officer is 
-9-
act ing as a reasonable off icer would and 
should act under the circumstances. 
Excluding the evidence can in no way 
affect h i s future conduct unless i t i s 
to make him l e s s wi l l ing to do h is 
duty." 
104 S.Ct. at 3420, c i t i ng Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 
(1976) (White, J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) . 
Although LaQHf and i t s companion case, Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984), were decided in 
the context of reasonable re l iance by pol ice off icers on a 
warrant approved by a magis t ra te , there i s nothing in e i ther of 
those decisions to ind ica te t ha t the good f a i t h exception could 
not also properly apply in warrant less s i t u a t i o n s . S££ I .N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza., U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 3479, 3493 (1984) (White, 
J . , d i s sen t ing ) . In f ac t , the Court 's general discussion about 
the propr ie ty of a good f a i th exception s trongly suggests t h a t 
such an extension of JLajan would be acceptable and des i r ab le . For 
instance, in Leon the Court at one point states: 
[E]ven assuming that the rule effectively 
deters some police misconduct and provides 
incentives for the law enforcement profession 
as a whole to conduct itself in accord with 
the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, 
and should not be applied, to deter 
objectively reasonable law enforcement 
activity. 
104 S.Ct. at 3419. 
Signi f ican t ly , a number of courts have adopted a form 
of good fa i th exception to the exclusionary ru le in a warrant less 
search or se izure context . £££, e .g . . United Sta tes v. Owens. 
607 F. Supp. 140, 144-6 (D.C. Okla. 1983); United Sta tes v. 
Wyler, 502 F.Supp. 969, 973-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The leading case 
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appears to be United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 
1980) (en banc), cert, ilenied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) , where the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence seized from the 
defendant incident to a warrantless arrest, which was ultimately 
determined to have been unlawful, should not be excluded because 
"evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule 
where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that 
are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, 
belief that they are authorized." 622 F.2d at 840. The court 
analyzed the appropriateness of a good faith exception in much 
the same way that the Supreme Court did in LQQR, emphasizing that 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is not furthered 
if the rule is applied to situations where police officers have 
acted in the good faith belief that their conduct is lawful. 622 
F.2d at 842. Numerous courts have cited Williams with approval. 
Etg. United States yt Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146 (10th cir. 1985); 
Donovan v. Federal Clearing Die Casting Co.. 695 F.2d 1020 (7th 
cir. 1982); United States v, Nolan, 530 F.Supp. 386 (W.D. Pa. 
1981), alLLd, 718 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1983); State v. Verkuylen, 
120 Wis.2d 59, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. App. 1982); State v. Glass, 9 
Ohio Misc.2d 10, 458 N.E.2d 1302 (Ohio Com. Pi. 1983). In short, 
the Williams opinion embodies the logical extension of L£JQH into 
the area of warrantless searches and seizures. It is difficult 
to conceive of any compelling reason why the Supreme Court would 
noj: apply the heon rule in a case where an officer's warrantless 
conduct, subsequently determined to be in violation of the fourth 
amendment, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 
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£££ Bloom/ United Sta tes v. Leon And I t s Ramifications. 56 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 247/ 259-61 (1985); J^llt ££& People v. Ciraolo , 161 
Cal.App.3d 1081/ 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 f 95 (Cal. App. 1984) ( s t a t ing 
tha t Lean has no appl ica t ion to warrant less searches) f ££i±. 
granted, 105 S.Ct. 2672 (1985). 
Upon examining LJQQH and Williams, i t l og i ca l ly follows 
tha t Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) f which appears to be l i t t l e more than 
a codif ica t ion of the good f a i t h exceptions to the exclusionary 
ru le fashioned in Lfijon and Williams, i s not unconst i tu t ional 
under the federal cons t i t u t i on . See People v. Deitchman, 695 
P.2d 1146/ 1153 (Colo. 1985) (Ericksonf C.J . r concurring) 
(observing t h a t Colorado's s t a tu to ry "good f a i t h " exception to 
the exclusionary ru le i s consis tent with fourth amendment 
precedent and does not v i o l a t e federal cons t i tu t iona l s t andards ) . 
So long as Rule 12(g) i s applied in a manner consis tent with the 
object ive standard of reasonableness adopted by the Supreme 
Court/ Lsjon, 104 S.Ct. a t 3420 n. 20f Utah's s t a tu to ry good f a i th 
exception i s not contrary to federal law. 
B. The Utah Constitution 
The further question of whether Rule 12(g) is contrary 
to article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution remains. 
Historically/ this Court has decided search and seizure issues by 
applying federal precedents developed under the fourth amendment. 
£££, e.g.. State v. Gallegos, 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1985); ££&££ 
v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 
715 (Utah 1983). The federal version of the exclusionary rule 
has consistently been applied as the sole remedy for a violation 
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of an individuals constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Hygh, 16 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10, 16 (1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately). 
However, as noted by Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion 
in Hygh, "fslound arguments . . . can be made against acceptance 
of the federal version of the exclusionary rule as the sole 
remedy for unlawful searches and seizures," and "ttlhe federal 
law as it currently exists is certainly not the only permissible 
interpretation of the search and seizure protections contained in 
the Utah Constitution." 16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. Justice 
Zimmerman further observed that "this Court has never considered 
the appropriateness of possible exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule or the availability of alternative or supplemental remedies, 
such as the imposition of civil liability on police officers." 
i b i d . 3 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Utah i s one of but a handful of s t a t e s 
t h a t have enac ted a s t a t u t o r y "good f a i t h " excep t ion to the 
exc lus iona ry r u l e . §§ 77-35-12(g) and 78-16-5 (Supp. 1985) . See 
a l so ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3925 (Supp. 1985) ; COLO. REV. STAT. § 
16-3-308 (Supp. 1985)? CAL. CONST, a r t . I , § 28(d) (which appears 
t o e l i m i n a t e the exc lu s iona ry r u l e fo r a l l " r e l e v a n t " ev idence ) ; 
S. 237 (a b i l l now pending i n Congress—see a l s o S. 1764, 98th 
Cong., 2d S e s s . , 130 CONG. REC. S1066 (da i ly ed . Feb. 7 , 1984), 
an i d e n t i c a l b i l l which passed t h e f u l l Senate in 1984 by a vo te 
3
 The wisdom of the exc lus iona ry r u l e has f r equen t l y been the 
s u b j e c t of debate among commentators. £££ S t a t e v . B o l t , 142 
A r i z . 260, 689 P.2d 519, 528 n. 1 (1984) (Cameron, J u s t i c e , 
s p e c i a l l y c o n c u r r i n g ) . 
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of 63-24) . 4 Admittedly, the s t a t u t e s in other s t a t e s have not 
been free from c r i t i c i sm . SLae, e .g . , S t ross f The Colorado 
Statutory Good-Faith Exception To The Exclusionary Rule; A Step 
Too Far? . 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 809 (1982). However, commentary on 
Utah's Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1982, 1982 Utah Laws, 
Chap. 10, §§ 1-16, which added, in t e r a l i a , § 77-35-12(g) and §§ 
78-16-1 through - 1 1 , has generally been favorable. £££ Comment, 
1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 138-46; Comment, 9 J . Contemp. L. 171 
(1983). What d i s t inguishes the Utah scheme from those in the 
other s t a t e s noted i s t h a t i t provides both an appropriate 
modification of the exclusionary rule and a c i v i l remedy for the 
defendant whose cons t i tu t iona l r igh ts have been v io la t ed . An 
exce l len t ou t l ine of the Act ' s provisions appears in 9 J . 
Contemp. L. at 184-5: 
The Utah Act waives the s t a tu to ry 
immunity from s u i t tha t governmental e n t i t i e s 
are able to invoke for i n ju r i e s "proximately 
caused or a r i s ing out of a v io l a t ion of 
protected fourth amendment r i g h t s . " I t 
provides a cause of act ion for damages to 
injured p a r t i e s against the peace officer who 
v i o l a t e s t h e i r fourth amendment r igh t s and/or 
the o f f i c e r ' s employing agency. 
Under the Act, the offending off icer and 
the o f f i c e r ' s employing agency are j o i n t l y 
and several ly l i a b l e for damages if the 
v io l a t ion i s negl igent . The off icer alone i s 
l i a b l e for damages " t i l f the v io la t ion [ i s ] 
s u b s t a n t i a l , grossly negl igent , w i l l f u l , or 
malicious . . . unless the v io la t ion [ i s ] the 
r e su l t of a general order of the agency. 
When the search or seizure i s committed 
in t en t iona l ly but in good f a i t h , the 
employing agency alone i s l i a b l e for damages. 
The Act provides t ha t an injured par ty 
4
 Appendix B contains the tex t of each of the s t a t e provisions 
and the proposed federal law. 
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may sue to recover nominal damages in the 
amount of $100 plus any costs and attorneys1 
fees. In addition, the victim of an illegal 
search or seizure may recover "actual 
damages, including but not limited to injury 
to personf propertyf or reputation." If the 
violation is "substantial, grossly negligent, 
willful, or malicious," the Act provides that 
recovery may includef in addition to nominal 
and actual damages, exemplary or punitive 
damages. The Act specifically excludes 
recovery of damages for injuries "resulting 
from a conviction and judgment . . . 
including incarceration, fines, or 
restitution." The Act provides for a cause 
of action and the recovery of damages in lieu 
of the exclusion of otherwise admissible 
evidence in criminal cases. 
The statutory cause of action and the 
ability to recover nominal, actual, and 
punitive damages is provided in lieu of the 
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence in 
most circumstances. However, the 
exclusionary rule may still be applied under 
the Utah Act when a fourth amendment 
violation is both "substantial" and not 
committed in "good faith." Evidence gained 
in this manner can be suppressed at any stage 
of the criminal proceeding. An individual 
whose rights are violated substantially and 
in bad faith, may elect either to exclude the 
evidence or to sue for damages. When the 
individual chooses to have the evidence 
suppressed, however, the Act precludes any 
additional monetary recovery. 
The Act . . . also allows the employing 
agency to take administrative or disciplinary 
action against an errant officer. 
Finally, the Act provides that when 
there is a victim of a crime, and the 
convicted criminal is awarded damages based 
on a fourth amendment violation, the victim 
of the original crime is entitled to a lien 
against the convicted criminal1s award as 
restitution. [Footnote citations to relevant 
statutes omitted.] 
Unlike the laws in other states, Utah's Act more 
closely resembles the legislative substitute for the exclusionary 
rule suggested by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Blvens 
v> Six Unknown Federal Narcotics AgentSr 403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
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Theref he outlined the following requirements: 
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to 
the illegal acts of law enforcement officials 
committed in the performance of assigned 
duties; 
(b) the creation of a cause of action 
for damages sustained by any person aggrieved 
by conduct of governmental agents in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment or statutes 
regulating official conduct; 
(c) the creation of a tribunalf quasi-
judicial in nature or perhaps patterned after 
the United States Court of CIaims, to 
adjudicate all claims under the statute: 
(d) a provision that this statutory 
remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of 
evidence secured for use in criminal cases in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and 
(e) a provision directing that no 
evidence/ otherwise admissible/ shall be 
excluded from any criminal proceeding because 
of violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
403 U.S. at 422-3 (Burgerf C.J.f dissenting). Beyond its 
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Bivens 
dissentf the Utah Act appears to be the kind of modification of 
the exclusionary rule that the concurring justices in Hygh would 
find acceptable. In short/ it strikes a reasonable balance 
between competing interests by applying the exclusionary rule in 
a criminal case only when that rule is most likely to have its 
desired deterrent effect and awarding civil damages to those 
whose rights have been violated. Two important societal 
interests are protected: valid and trustworthy evidence that 
will lead a factfinder to the truth is not excluded in criminal 
trials/ and one deprived of an important constitutional right is 
cdmpensated for that wrong. 
The legislature of this statef which presumably enacts 
only that legislation it believes to be constitutional under both 
the federal and state constitutions/ has spoken on the issue of 
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modifying the exclusionary rule in criminal cases by enacting the 
Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1982. This Court implicitly 
adopted Rule 12(g) when, in In Rg: Rules of Procedure, 18 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (1985), it adopted all existing statutory rules of 
procedure not inconsistent with procedural rules previously 
adopted by the Court. See Hygh, 16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 
(Zimmerman, J.f concurring specially) ("I have found no case in 
which this Court has decided to adopt the exclusionary rule after 
independently analyzing the question of what remedy is available 
for unlawful search or seizure under our state constitution"). 
Moreover, rules of procedure are not solely the province of the 
judiciary in this state; the Utah Constitution allows the 
legislature to modify procedural rules promulgated by this Court. 
UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 4. Given the compelling policy 
arguments supporting the application of Rule 12(g), which 
operates in conjunction with §§ 78-16-1 through -11, this Court 
should not interpret the Utah Constitution so as to invalidate 
that rule. Although in other instances it may be appropriate, 
there is no good reason here to construe article I, section 14 
more narrowly than the federal courts have the fourth amendment. 
2£& State v. Westlung, 705 P.2d 208, 216-7 (Or. App. 1985) (Van 
Hoomissen, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part). By 
recognizing that Rule 12(g) is applicable in criminal cases and 
constitutional under the state constitution, the Court will not 
effectively gut the protections provided in article 1, section 
14—the scope of which may or may not be congruent with the scope 
of fourth amendment protections. What will constitute a 
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"subs tan t i a l " v io la t ion under Rule 12(g) necessar i ly depends on 
what course the Court decides to take in developing future search 
and se izure law in Utah. The Court could develop a jurisprudence 
of s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l law to replace the sometimes confusing 
federal precedents in t h i s a rea . Hygh, 16 Utah Adv. Rep* at 15-
16 (Zimmermanif J . , concurring s p e c i a l l y ) . "Clear-cut ru l e s " tha t 
guide f ra ther than befuddle, government o f f i c i a l s could be 
fashioned by in t e rp re t ing the search and seizure provisions in 
Utah's cons t i tu t ion d i f fe ren t ly than the United S ta tes Supreme 
Court has in te rpre ted the fourth amendment if t h i s Court thinks 
i t necessary in order to avoid " imperi l l ing] both the r i gh t s of 
indiv iduals and the i n t e g r i t y and effect iveness of law 
enforcement." Xhld. Thus, recognit ion of Rule 12(g) as both a 
des i rable and cons t i tu t iona l component of Utah law i s the f i r s t 
s tep toward a more sensible approach to enforcement of the 
criminal laws without compromising an i nd iv idua l ' s r igh ts under 
the fourth amendment and a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14. 
In conclusion, the Court should hold tha t Rule 12(g) i s 
not only c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , but also the cont ro l l ing ru le in a l l 
criminal cases when the question of suppression of evidence for 
an a l legedly unlawful search or se izure i s presented. 
POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT STANDARD 
OF LAW IN DETERMINING THAT THE STOP OF 
DEFENDANTS1 VEHICLE WAS UNLAWFUL. UNDER THE 
PROPER STANDARD, THE OFFICERS1 STOP OF THE 
VEHICLE WAS LEGAL. ALTERNATIVELY, THE STOP 
WAS NEITHER A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF 
DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS NOR A 
VIOLATION COMMITTED IN BAD FAITH. 
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APPENDIX B 
Arizona 
513-3922 
Mote 2.4 
md C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 
r\2d57. 
L&. Borden of proof 
If person from whom property was taken chal-
bnges seizure of Hems not named in search 
warrant, state must establish legality of seizure 
sf such items by preponderance of evidence, and 
nay do so by showing that property is unlawful 
fas possess, that property is stolen, or by showing 
some other reason why property is subject to 
seizure. Search Warrants C-419847 and 
C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 P.2d 
57. 
State has burden to prove that property seized 
without warrant was nevertheless lawfully 
seized under some exception to warrant require-
ment; if, however, warrant has been issued, 
there is presumption that warrant is valid, requi-
site probable cause having been shown, and it is 
then individual's burden to prove invalidity of 
search and seizure. Search Warrants C-419847 
and C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 
P.2d57. 
CRIMINAL CODE 
Unlike challenge to grounds for issuing search 
warrant where individual bears burden of proof, 
state must bear burden once individual establish-
es that item seized from him is not described is 
search warrant Search Warrants C-419847 and 
C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 P.2d 
57. 
S. Review 
Motion for restoration of seized property, con-
troverting grounds upon which warrants were 
issued, was civil in nature, notwithstanding that 
pertinent statute, this section, is found in crimi-
nal code; order denying motion which disposed 
of cause on merits and left no question remain-
ing for judicial determination was civil judgment 
appealable as of right to the Court of Appeals 
Greehling v. State (1982} 135 Ark. 498, 662 P.2d 
1005. 
4. Jurisdiction 
Court of appeals has jurisdiction to review 
request for relief under this section. Mehrens v. 
State (App.1983) 138 Ariz. 458, 675 P.2d 718, 
certiorari denied 105 S.Ct 219, 83 LEd.2d 149 
| i$-3$25. Admissibility of « unlawful search or 
seizure; definitions 
A. If a party in a criminal proceeding seeks to exclude evidence from the trier of fact 
because of the conduct of a peace officer in obtaining the evidence, the proponent of the 
evidence may urge that the peace officer's conduct was taken in a reasonable, good faith 
belief that the conduct was proper and that the evidence discovered should not be kept 
from the trier of fact if otherwise admissible. 
B. The trial court shall not suppress evidence which is otherwise admissible in a 
criminal proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace 
officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation. 
C In this section: 
1. "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concerning the exist-
ence of facta which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause. 
7 Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon: 
ii I statute which is subsequently ruled unconstitutional. 
(b) A warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake. 
(c) A controlling court precedent which is later overruled, unless the court overruling 
the precedent orders the new precedent to be applied retroactively. 
D. This section shall not be construed to limit the enforcement of any appropriate civil 
remedy or criminal sanction in actions pursuant to other provisions of law against any 
individual or government entity found to have conducted an unreasonable search or 
seizure. 
B. This section does not apply to unlawful electronic eavesdropping or wiretapping 
Added by Laws 1982, Ch 161, { 
IMS Reviser's Note 
Pursuant to authority of f 41-1304.02, *', defi-
nitions" was added to the heading of this section. 
Librmry References 
Criminal Law •=•394.4(1). 
CJ.S. Criminal Law § 657<2) et seq. 
Cross References 
Issuance of warrant, 
| 1&-3913. 
probable cause, see Not es of Decision! 
In general 
176 
Cal ] f o r n i a 
A r t . 1, § 2 8 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
(c) Right to Safe Schools. All students and staff of public primary, 
elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right 
to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful. 
(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute here-
after enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of 
the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal 
proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, 
or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether 
heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any 
existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or 
Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall 
affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press 
(e) Public Safety Bail. A person may be released on bail by suffi-
cient sureties, except for capital crimes when the facts are evident or the 
presumption great Excessive bail may not be required In setting 
reducing or denying bail, the judge or magistrate shall take into consid-
eration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense 
charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probabili-
ty of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the case. Public 
safety shall be the primary consideration. 
A person may be released on his or her own recognizance m the court s 
discretion, subject to the same factors considered m setting bail How-
ever, no person charged with the commission of anv senous felom shall 
be released on his or her own recognizance 
Before any person arrested for a serious felony may be released on 
bail, a hearing may be held before the magistrate or judge, and the 
prosecuting attorney shall be given notice and reasonable opportunit} to 
be heard on the matter. 
When a judge or magistrate grants or denies bail or release on a 
person's own recognizance, the reasons for that decision shall be stated 
in the record and included in the court's minutes 
(f) Use of Prior Convictions. Any prior felony conviction of any 
person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall 
subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or 
enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding When a prior 
felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall bt proven 
to the trier of fact in open court 
(f) Serious felony. As used in this article, the term * serious felony" 
is any crime defined in Penal Code, Section 1192 7(c). 
(Added by Initiative Measure, approved b> the people, June 8, 1982) 
Amendment of Const. Art J, § 12 by Assembly Const 
Amend. No. U (1982) was approved by a higher affirmative 
vote at the primary election held June 8t 1982 than Initiative 
Measure which repealed Const Art. 1 § 12, and added this 
$ection which included a new provision on "Public Safety 
Bail". If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the 
same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the 
highest affirmative vote thall preiatl see Const Art 2 § 10, 
Art IS, § k 
b l i 
Colorado 
rmcM - acctitficb any ^cizurcb io-.v.Hir> 
n CONTENT AND SUFFICIENCY OF 
AFFIDAVIT. 
Judge must look within the four corners, etc. 
In accord with original See People v. 
jjndholm. 197 Colo. 270, 591 P.2d 1032 (1979). 
Affidavit interpreted with common sense. In 
0icrprcling an affidavit for a search warrant 
gnd the execution of the warrant, a common 
^nse interpretation must be applied People v. 
pel Alamo. 624 P.2d 1304 (Colo. 1981). 
Affidavit must supph underlying fact. 
In accord with original See People v. 
Lindholm. 197 Colo. 270, 591 P.2d 1032 (1979); 
People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1982) 
Identification of wrong ftreet not dispositive 
if affidavits efficacy. Fact that the affidavit 
identified the wrong street, which was less 
than one block away from the actual location 
of the truck to be searched, was not dispositive 
of an affidavit's efificac> People \ Del 
Alamo. 624 P.2d 13(U (Colo 19811. 
For evidence constituting prohabk cause. See 
People v. Lindholm. 197 Colo 270 591 P 2d 
1032 (1979). 
Deletion of inaccuracies not foul. eu. 
The fact thai some portions of an affidavji 
must be stricken because the> are erroneous. 
or that a portion of the evidence relied on for 
a finding of probable cause is not properK 
recorded and ma> not be considered does not 
require the issuing magistrate to ignore the 
other information supplied by the affidavit. 
People v. Gable, 647 P 2d 246 (Colo App. 
1982) 
A search warrant may be barrel oc hearsay, 
etc. 
In accord with original. See People v. 
Lindholm, 197 Colo. 270,591 P.2d 1032 (1979). 
I. General Consideration. 
Ill Description of Property. 
I GENERAL CONSIDERATION. 
Annotator's Bote. For further annotations 
concerning search and seizure, see section 7 
of article II of the Colorado Constitution and . 
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. 
ID DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY. 
Search warrant reasonably specific under cir-
cumstances. See People v. Lindholm, 197 
Colo. 270, 591 P.2d 1032(1979). 
In determining whether warrant is too gen-
eral, the nature of the property to be seized 
must be considered People v. Lindholm, 197 
Colo. 270, 591 P.2d 1032 (1979); People v. Ball. 
639 P.2d 1078 (Colo. 1982), People v. Hill, 690 
P.2d 856 (Colo. 1984). 
16-3-305. Search warrants - direction - execution and return. 
Annotator » note. Foi further annotations 
concerning search and seizure, sec section 7 
of article II of the Colorado Constitution and 
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. 
Evidence seized in violation of a statutory 
provision may be suppressed onJ> if the 
unauthorized search and seizure violated con-
stitutional restraints on unreasonable searches 
and seizures People v. Hamer, 689 P.2d 1147 
(Colo App. 1984). 
16-3-308. Evidence - admissibility - declaration or purpose. (1) Evidence 
which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed 
by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by 
a peace officer, as defined in section 18-1-901 (3) (1), C.R.S., as a result of 
a good faith mistake or of a technical violation. 
(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section: 
(a) "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concern 
ing the existence of facts or law which if true would be sufficient to constitute 
probable cause. 
(b) "Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon 
a statute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invali-
dated due to a good faith mistake, or a court precedent which is later over-
ruled. 
• .V.W8 Criminal Proceedings I 
(3) Evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding and 
hich is obtained as a result of a confession voluntarily made in a 
>ncustodiaI setting shall not be suppressed by the trial court. 
(4) (a) It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of Colo 
do that, when evidence is sought to be excluded from the trier of fact in 
criminal proceeding because of the conduct of a peace officer leading to 
discovery, it will be open to the proponent of the evidence to urge thai 
e conduct in question was taken in a reasonable, good faith belief that it 
*s proper, and in such instances the evidence so discovered should not be 
;pt from the trier of fact if otherwise admissible. This section is necessary 
identify the characteristics of evidence which will be admissible in a court 
law. This section does not address or attempt to prescribe court procedure. 
(b) It shall be prima facie evidence that the conduct of the peace officer 
is performed in the reasonable good faith belief that it was proper if there 
a showing that the evidence was obtained pursuant to and within the scope 
a warrant, unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and mate-
J misrepresentation. 
Source: Atliifo, in,ii p. 922, § )(a) and (4) amended, 1 85, p 615, 
f3 ,4 . 
>oss reference: For the-1*: - - -*
 t . •>- _ o •:;^ : ' hue < 
de'\see$ 19-2-107. 
Editor's note: Section 14 of chapter 135, Session Laws of Colorado 1985, provides that sections 
nd 4 of the act set out in that chapter amending subsections (2Ka) and \4) is effective July 
985, and applies to evidence obtained on or after said date 
jinoUtor's note. For annotations concern 
the exclusionary rule, see section 7 of ani-
II of the Colorado Constitution and 
orado Rules of Criminal Procedure 26 and 
aw reviews. For article, "Colorado's Good-
th Exception to the Exclusionary Rule", 
II Colo. Law. 410 (1982). For article, 
xxl-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary 
e: The Fourth Amendment is Not a Techni-
ty'\ see 11 Colo Law. 704 (1982). For arti-
* 'Attacking the Seizure — Over-coming 
»d Faith", sec 11 Colo Law. 2395 (1982). 
note, "The Colorado Statutory Good-
h Exception to the Exclusionary Rule : A 
> Too Far?" see 53 U. Colo L. Rev. 809 
12). For comment. "Privacy Rights v. Law 
orcemenl Difficulties: The clash of Com 
ng Interests in New York v. Belton", sec 
U. Den LJ. 793 (1982). For article 
arrant Requirement — The Burger Court 
>roach". see 53 U. Colo L. Rev. 691 
12). For article, "Search Warrants, Hear 
and Probable Cause — The Supreme Court 
mte* the Rules", see 12 Colo Law 1250 
3). For article, "Criminal Procedure. 
:h discusses a recent Tenth Circuit deci-
deaiing with the exclusionary rule. >ee 61 
Den. L.J. 291 (1984). For comment. 1 he 
Good Faith Exception: The Seventh Circuit 
Limits the Exclusionary Rule in the Adminis-
trative Context", sec 61 Den. L.J. 597 (1984) 
Section inapplicable to mistaken judgment of 
far*. A mistaken judgment of law, such as the 
mistaken judgment by an officer that the facts 
known to him are sufficient to warrant a full 
custodial arrest of the defendant, is insuffi-
cient to cause the application of this statute 
People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983). 
cert, granted, 463 U.S. 1206. 77 L. Ed 2d 1386 
104 S. Ct. 62. cert dismissed, 463 U S 1206. 
104 S. Ct. 543, 78 L. Ed.2d 719 (1983) (decided 
under subsection (2Ka) prior to 1985 amend-
ment). 
Search by police of tenant's premises based 
on consent by landlord is mistake of law since 
it is well settled that a landlord cannot p^i 
such consent. People v. Brewer. 690 P.2d 860 
(Colo. 1984). 
Section does not apply to an. arrest based on 
i warrant void from its inception due to the 
absence of any cause whatever for its issu 
ance. People v. Mitchell, 678 P.2d 990 (Colo 
1984) 
No technical violation *here court precedent 
relied on »*> bax-d on difTtrrnt facts. Technical 
Senate B i l l 
D 
9 9 T H CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION S.237 
To amend title 18 to limit the application of the exclusionary rule. 
IN T H E S E N A T E OF T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S 
J ANT ART 22 (legislative day, JANTABY 21), . 
Mr. THURMOND (for himself, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. HATCH, Mr. ABDNOE, Mr. 
CHILES, Mr DOMENICI, Mr. LONG, Mr. ZOBNISKY, Mr. DENTON, Mr. 
JOHNSTON, Mr. T'RIBLE, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. EAST, Mr. HELMS, and Mr. 
BOBEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 
the Committee on the Judiciary 
A BILL 
To amend title 18 to limit the application of the exclusionary 
rule. 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 inx \S' of the I nitt d State \s of i Imerica in Congress assembled, 
3 That this Act ina\ be cited as the "Exclusionary Rule Limi-
' 198 3M 
5 S E C . 2. (a) Chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code, 
(i i- hniHidrd h\ ioidntj; nl llir mil ihrrrul llu following new 
7 section: 
2 
rule 
""' E x c e p t a s s p e c i fi c a 11} p i o ( 5 d e d b; s t a t u t e e \ i d e i :t c c • 
which is obta ined as a result of a search or seizure and which 
,s otl lerw ise ad missible shall i :iot be c xch ised ii i a proceed ii lg 
8 in a court of the 1 nited S t a t e s if the search or seizure w a s 
J" II 11 J d i: r t a k e i i i i i a r e a s o n a b 1 e, g o o d l"i ;: 4 "l " 1 •| 11; i % ( 4 T i <: * i t w a s i i i 
8 conformity with the fourth amendmeiv t< !.v Constitution of 
• • * . - - . -> - rr v, s obtained 
1* pursuant t*> as.*; v. :. .he scope <•: r. warrai it constitutes 
l>rin la ** i \ndence oi such a reasonable good I aith belief, 
12 unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and ma-
1M terial misrepresentation.f\ 
14 0»» T!»' table of sections of such chapter is amended by 
io auunig ai iiitr end thereof the following item: 
"3505. Limitation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.". 
o 
